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Abstract Andy Egan has recently presented a prominent objection to causal
decision theory (CDT). However, in this paper, I argue that this objection fails if
CDT’s proponent accepts the plausible view that decision-theoretic options are
intentions. This result both provides a defence of CDT against a prominent objec-
tion and highlights the importance of resolving the nature of decision-theoretic
options.
Keywords Causal decision theory  Intentions  Options
Does decision theory evaluate what acts we should carry out, what decisions we
should make, or something else entirely? One natural view is that it tells us what
intentions we should, or should not, form. In this paper, I will show that Egan’s
(2007) objection to causal decision theory (CDT) fails if we accept this view, along
with a popular view of the nature of intentions (roughly, that in Bratman 1987). Not
only does this bolster CDT but it also reveals the importance of clarifying what
options decision theory evaluates. After all, we need to do so in order to resolve a
broader decision-theoretic dispute.
1 Causal decision theory and Egan
Start with CDT. According to this theory, an option, O, is permissible if it
maximises expected utility (EU), defined as follows:
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Here S refers to a set of possible states of the world. U(SO) is then a utility
function, which assigns a real number to outcomes (conjunctions of a state and an
option), with a higher number representing a more desirable outcome. Finally,
CrðSnOÞ is a causal credence, which captures the causal impact of O on S. There is
debate about how we should think of this credence (see Joyce 1999) but for my
purposes, this can be thought of as the agent’s credence in the non-backtracking
counterfactual ‘‘If I were to O then the world would be in state S’’.
Egan’s objection to this theory can now be outlined via the Blade Runner’s
Button (a variant on Egan’s Psychopath Button)1:
In a future where androids often commit murder, Lil faces a button that
permanently deactivates all androids. Lil weakly desires to deactivate the
androids but strongly desires to live.
Now Lil thinks she’s unlikely to be an android. However, she knows: (a) that
humans tend not to press such buttons; and (b) that androids are programmed
with subconscious self-destructive tendencies and so would be likely to press.
Consequently, Lil thinks that only an android would be likely to press the
button.
Plausibly, Lil should not press. After all, if she does then she’s almost certainly
an android and so pressing will almost certainly kill her. Surely, Lil should not press
if she’s confident that if she does so then this will cause her death.
However, at least given a natural reading of the options evaluated by decision
theory (perhaps a reading on which options are actions), CDT endorses pressing.
Informally, this follows from the fact that Lil is confident that she’s not an android
and so confident that pressing will deactivate all androids but won’t kill her
(combined with the fact that pressing doesn’t cause her to be an android). So
pressing has better causal effects than not pressing and so CDT endorses pressing.
More formally, this result follows from the fact that CrðandroidnpressÞ ¼
CrðandroidnrefrainÞ ¼ CrðandroidÞ (because Lil’s choice doesn’t causally influence
whether she’s an android), combined with the fact that CrðandroidÞ is low. For
concreteness, let’s imagine that Lil has a credence of 0.01 that she’s an android (and
so a credence of 0.99 that she’s not an android). Further, we can take death to
contribute - 100 to the utility of an outcome and ridding the world of androids to
contribute 5. The utilities of the outcomes here will then be as outlined in Table 1.
The EU of the two options can now be calculated as:
1 I owe this Blade-Runner inspired variant, to Richard Holton. I rely on it to avoid discussing
exterminating those with a classified mental health condition.
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EUðpressÞ ¼ CrðandroidnpressÞUðandroid ^ pressÞ
þ CrðhumannpressÞUðhuman ^ pressÞ
¼ 0:01  95 þ 0:99  5
¼ 4
EUðrefrainÞ ¼ CrðandroidnrefrainÞUðandroid ^ refrainÞ
þ CrðhumannrefrainÞUðhuman ^ refrainÞ
¼ 0:01  0 þ 0:99  0
¼ 0
As EUðpressÞ[EUðrefrainÞ, CDT endorses pressing. Insofar as pressing is
irrational, CDT is in trouble.
2 Optionhood and intentions
Still, let’s set this difficulty aside for a moment to ask a question about CDT. So far,
I have said that CDT labels an option as permissible if it maximises EU. But what
are these options?
As Hedden (2012) portrays things, there are two natural views here. First,
perhaps options are acts: perhaps decision theory evaluates things like the act of
taking a job. Second, perhaps options are decisions: perhaps decision theory
evaluates things like the decision to take a job.
Hedden rejects the former view. Why? Well consider an agent who can carry out
one set of acts but believes she can carry out a distinct set of acts. Which of these
sets forms the agent’s options? Not the acts she can actually carry out (but believes
she cannot). After all, decision theory is a theory of a subjective, action-guiding
ought. However, an agent can’t be guided by a theory that takes as options
something she doesn’t realise she is capable of doing. Yet, equally, her options are
not those acts that she believes she can carry out (but actually can’t). After all, this
would sometimes lead to the implausible conclusion that the agent ought to do
something that she is unable to do. As an agent’s options cannot be acts of either
sort, the prospects for an options-as-acts view are dim.2
On the other hand, Hedden endorses the view that options are decisions.
Roughly, he argues that on any plausible account of decisions, an agent will know
what decisions she has the ability to make. If so, then there will be no room for the
Table 1 The blade runner’s button
Android Human
Press - 95 5
Refrain 0 0
2 This gives a mere sense of Hedden’s own, more detailed, argument. See Hedden (2012).
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above difficulties to arise, because there will be no room for an agent to believe she
can make one set of decisions but to actually be able to make some distinct set of
decisions. So accepting that options are decisions allows us to avoid the above
difficulty and so we have grounds to accept this view.
We can now ask a further question: what are decisions? Here, Hedden is less
forthcoming. However, he hints (in Hedden 2012, p. 352n) at the possibility that
decisions involve the formation of intentions. So to decide to / is to form an
intention to /. This is a very natural view (indeed, it’s a view that has been defended
previously: cf. Raz 1975). After all, if we accept that we do sometimes form
intentions then it would seem profligate to add in a distinct category of ‘‘making a
decision’’. Instead, it is more natural to think that making a decision just is forming
an intention.
So on a natural view, the options evaluated by decision theory involve the
formation of intentions.
3 Intentions and reconsideration
Fortunately, if options involve intention formation, Egan’s objection to CDT
collapses. In particular, if options involve intention formation then CDT will no
longer ultimately endorse pressing but rather will, as desired, endorse refraining. As
such, Egan’s objection to CDT relies on an assumption about the nature of
optionhood that the proponent of CDT can happily reject.
In order to demonstrate this, I will first outline a prominent account of intentions
[largely drawn from Bratman (1987) and Holton (2009)].3 On this account,
intentions establish default behaviour: if I form an intention to / then I will, by
default, /. In order to overcome this default, I must both reconsider my intention
and, in doing so, revise it. When should I revise an intention (once I’m
reconsidering it)? According to Bratman and Holton, I should do so if it would
be irrational to now form the intention. In other words, we can simply apply CDT to
determine whether I should revise or retain the intention.
When should I reconsider an intention?4 Well, as Holton (2009, pp. 160–162)
views things, we rarely consciously decide to reconsider. So instead of assessing the
rationality of a decision to reconsider, we should instead be assessing the rationality
of possessing certain subconscious habits of reconsideration. For example, perhaps
rational agents will have a habit of reconsidering intentions that they later discover
were formed under false pretenses.
Now, again on Holton’s view, there is no single, simple rule that captures rational
habits of reconsideration. Instead, there are a plethora of rules of thumb, each of
3 I will take the truth of this account for granted. As such, I am not providing a decisive argument that
CDT deals appropriately with the Blade Runner’s Button. Instead, I am showing that the proponent of
CDT has a natural response to Egan’s objection and, hence, showing that this objection lacks force unless
this response can be undermined. Note that Holton’s discussion is about resolutions, rather than intentions
in general. However, many of his points can be naturally extended to apply to intentions more generally.
4 In Sect. 5.3 I discuss the view that CDT should simply be applied in this context too.
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which provide some insight into rational reconsideration. Here, I will focus
primarily on one such rule (a rule that Holton himself did not discuss). To get to
this, it will help to consider a pair of cases.
DRINK DRIVING: Gareth knows that when drunk, he tends to think the dangers
of drink driving overblown and becomes tempted to drive home (so as to avoid
minor inconvenience). So, before he starts drinking, he forms an intention to
not drive if he has more than two beers. He hopes that this will enable him to
resist the temptation to drive drunk.
DRINK DANCING: Intan knows that when drunk, she comes to think her drunk
dancing less embarassing than it is. So, before she starts drinking, she forms an
intention to not dance if she has more than two beers. She hopes that this will
enable her to resist the temptation to dance drunk.
Now, DRINK DRIVING is a paradigm case where rational habits will ensure that
Gareth does not reconsider his intention in the face of temptation. That is, we would
judge Gareth’s rationality poorly if he reconsidered such a sensibly-formed
intention just because of his drunken views.
On the other hand, we could easily fill out DRINK DANCING such that it would be
rational for Intan to reconsider her intention. For example, perhaps after drinking,
Intan comes to believe that she is too uptight when sober and that it would benefit
her mental wellbeing to let go for once. In such circumstances, there’s nothing
wrong with Intan reconsidering her intention.
What makes for the difference between these cases? It’s not simply a matter of
impairment: both Gareth and Intan may suspect that drinking impairs their
judgements to just the same extent. Instead, what is different between the cases is
the agent’s beliefs about what’s at stake. In DRINK DRIVING, Gareth thought a lot was
at stake when he formed the intention (because he believed drink driving to be a
serious peril). However, when drunk he thought far less was at stake (because he
believed that driving drunk would merely save him from a minor inconvenience).
On the other hand, in DRINK DANCING Intan thought that comparatively little was at
stake when she formed the intention (she thought it a matter of embarassment).
Further, when drunk, Intan thinks that more than minor convenience is at stake,
because she thinks that letting loose would benefit her mental health.5
In order to get from this distinction to a rule of thumb for rational
reconsideration, let initial stakes refer to how bad the agent thinks it would be,
when she forms the intention, if she later abandoned the intention. Further, let later
5 As a referee noted, one might suspect that sober Intan would see her later dancing preferences as
involving legitimate preference change, while sober Gareth would not feel likewise about his later driving
preference. Perhaps this (rather than stakes) is what distinguishes the cases. However, imagine Gareth and
Intan’s changing preferences result purely from changing beliefs about their skill as drunk drivers and
dancers. Insofar as this belief change results from the misleading effects of alcohol, Gareth and Intan
would presumably each see their changing preferences as illegitimate (insofar as these result from
irrational changes to beliefs). Yet, plausibly, reconsideration remains rational for Intan but not Gareth.
Appeal to stakes accounts for this; appeal to an agent’s legitimacy judgements does not. So, I continue to
prefer an appeal to stakes here.
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stakes refer to how bad the agent thinks it would be, at the time of potential
reconsideration, if she does not abandon the intention.
Using this terminology, we can define:
STAKES: Rational habits of reconsideration will: (1) lead agents to reconsider
when later stakes are substantially more weighty than initial stakes; (2) lead to
non-reconsideration when the later stakes are substantially less weighty than
the initial stakes; (3) lead to either reconsideration or non-reconsideration
when the initial and later stakes are of similar weight.
Clause (2) of STAKES entails that Gareth should not revise his intention. After all,
here the initial stakes (potential death) are far more weighty than the later stakes (a
minor inconvenience). On the other hand, clause (3) of STAKES entails that Intan can
rationally either reconsider or not reconsider. After all, here the initial stakes
(embarrassment) are of similar weight to the later stakes (a minor gain in mental
wellbeing). So STAKES makes sense of the difference between the above cases.6
4 Intentions and androids
I now return to the Blade Runner’s Button. Here, if options involve intention
formation, CDT initially endorses forming the intention to press, as above. Still, we
must now ask whether a rational agent will reconsider this intention. STAKES reveals
that she will. After all, the initial stakes here were that the androids would survive,
rather than die. However, once Lil forms the intention to press she comes to believe
that she is almost certainly an android (as only an android is likely to press).
Consequently, the later stakes will be Lil’s own survival. Insofar as Lil cares far
more about her own survival than about ridding the world of androids, clause (1) of
STAKES comes into play. Consequently, Lil should reconsider her intention.7
Further, Lil will now revise her intention. After all, Lil now believes that she is
almost certainly an android and, in the light of this, CDT will endorse revising the
6 My core argument for STAKES appeals to these concrete cases. However, we might also be sympathetic
to this principle for more abstract reasons. To see why, note that in cases of potential intention
reconsideration there are two relevant perspectives: the agent’s perspective at the time of intention
formation and the agent’s perspective at the time of potential reconsideration. Now it might be felt that
plausible principles of intention reconsideration will need to give each of these perspectives their due.
After all, intentions can’t do some of the work required of them (say, in helping us to resist temptation) if
we always assess them entirely from our present (perhaps temptation-clouded) perspective. Yet it is also
clear that we must not allow ourselves to be held prisoner to our past perspectives, with our current
perspective being given no say. A natural question: if we must listen to both perspectives and they
provide divergent guidance, how is this guidance to be balanced? STAKES provides a plausible, partial
answer: we listen to the perspective that takes the most to be at stake.
7 What if Lil is not rational? Well, then she will not revise here intention. However, it’s hardly a surprise




intention.8 Why? Because Lil’s decision does not causally influence whether she’s
an android and given that she believes she’s an android, the best expected causal
effect comes from refraining rather than pressing.
More formally, this follows from the fact that CrðandroidnpressÞ ¼
CrðandroidnrefrainÞ ¼ CrðandroidÞ (because Lil’s choice doesn’t causally influence
whether she’s an android). For concreteness, we can imagine that Lil has a credence
of 0.99 that she’s an android, after she forms the intention to press. We can now
calculate the EU of the available options as follows:
EUðretainÞ ¼ CrðandroidnretainÞUðandroid ^ retainÞ
þ CrðhumannretainÞUðhuman ^ retainÞ
¼ 0:99  95 þ 0:01  5
¼ 94
EUðreviseÞ ¼ CrðandroidnreviseÞUðandroid ^ reviseÞ
þ CrðhumannreviseÞUðhuman ^ reviseÞ
¼ 0:99  0 þ 0:01  0
¼ 0
EUðreviseÞ[EUðretainÞ, so a rational agent should revise.
So Lil will now intend to refrain from pressing the button. Should she reconsider
this intention? By clause (2) of STAKES she should not. After all, the initial stakes
here were Lil’s life (that is, when Lil formed this new intention, she took her life to
be at stake). On the other hand, the later stakes involve the less weighty
consideration of whether the androids are wiped out. So, having formed the
intention to refrain from pressing, Lil should not reconsider. Consequently, she will
act in accordance with the default established by this intention and so will refrain
from pressing.
CDT’s proponent can now respond to Egan’s objection. After all, CDT will not
ultimately endorse pressing in the the Blade Runner’s Button. It may initially
endorse forming the intention to do so but a rational agent will then reconsider and
revise this intention. Having then come to intend to refrain, the agent will stand by
this intention and so refrain. CDT is compatible with the judgement that rational
agents will refrain in the Blade Runner’s Button.
5 Three objections
At this point, three objections arise.
8 This part of the solution echoes the deliberative response to Egan’s cases discussed in Arntzenius
(2008) and Joyce (2012). However, unlike those solutions, the solution to be developed here will ensure
that rational agents refrain from pressing the button, even if CDT is true. Contra this, Joyce ends up
suggesting that rational agents may choose either option (and Arntzenius suggests something similar).
Insofar as it seems problematic to say that pressing is permissible, even if it is not required, this means
that the solution presented here has an important virtue lacked by these previous solutions.
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5.1 Objection 1: Wasted effort
First, it might be argued that there is something problematic about CDT initially
endorsing pressing (regardless of what a rational agent will later do, after having
formed this intention).
Perhaps this objection will strike some as self-evident: insofar as pressing seems
problematic, it might be taken to be obvious that an adequate theory of choice
should never endorse forming the intention to press. Yet I simply deny the force of
this brute appeal to intuition. Yes, there seems to be something wrong with Lil
pressing the button, given that she expects doing so to cause her death.
Nevertheless, I see no reason to think that there’s anything obviously wrong with
forming the intention to press, especially if Lil expects that she will ultimately
repudiate this intention. Merely forming this intention does not, in itself, have any
bad consequences. So a brute appeal to intuition here does not strike me as deeply
concerning.
Still, a further argument could be provided to bolster the objection. To get to such
an argument, note that forming and revising an intention comes at some cost (in
time and mental effort). As such, CDT’s guidance here leads agents to act in an
unnecessarily costly manner, given that they could simply form the intention to
refrain from the get go. So there seems to be something problematic about the fact
that CDT initially endorses pressing.9
However, this objection contains the seeds of its own resolution. In particular, the
utilities in Table 1 presupposed that deciding to press would actually lead Lil to go
on to press. On the other hand, if Lil believes that electing to press would ultimately
lead her to refraining then the utility value of the pressing option within each state
should be the same as the utility value of the refraining option (because in both
cases, she will ultimately refrain).10 Indeed, once we account for the fact that
reconsidering and revising intentions is costly, the utility value of pressing in each
state should be lower than the utility value of refraining (because intending to press
will lead to costly reconsideration and revision). Letting the effort of reconsidering
and revising contribute - 1 to the utility of an outcome, the utilities in the Blade
Runner’s Button will be as per Table 2
It is now clear enough that the EU of pressing will be - 1 and the EU of
refraining will be 0. So refraining maximises EU. As such, CDT will immediately
endorse refraining rather than pressing, because it would be futile to form an
intention that one knows one will go on to revise (rather than simply forming the
later intention immediately). So CDT does not endorse pressing at any point. The
current objection collapses.
9 I owe this concern to an anonymous referee.
10 What if Lil doesn’t believe this? Well, then the following will not apply. But it is hardly surprising that
an agent might act suboptimally if she either fails to act rationally or believes falsely about some crucial
matter. So CDT is not threatened by the undesirability of Lil’s behaviour under such circumstances.
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5.2 Objection 2: Countervailing habits
Another objection arises. So far, I’ve discussed just the rule of thumb captured by
STAKES. Still, as I noted earlier, there are other rules of thumb for rational
reconsideration too. This raises the possibility that accounting for these other rules
might disrupt the outlined view about how Lil ought to behave.
Of course, a mere possibility is not itself grounds for great concern.
Unfortunately, a more concrete version of this objection can be presented. In
particular, consider the following:
FORESIGHT: Rational habits of reconsideration will not lead an agent to
reconsider on the basis of changes that the agent anticipated when she formed
her intention.
Why accept FORESIGHT? Well, anticipated changes were accounted for when the
agent formed the intention and so it might seem like double counting to reconsider
on the basis of these changes.
However, a problem now arises. After all, in the Blade Runner’s Button, Lil
knows that once she forms the intention to press the button, she will come to believe
that she’s probably an android. So FORESIGHT suggests she should not reconsider on
the basis of coming to believe this (and so should not reconsider on the basis of the
influence that this shift in belief has on the perceived stakes). So FORESIGHT appears
to undermine my argument.
In responding to this concern, the first thing to discuss is the way in which we
should read rules of thumb like FORESIGHT and STAKES. In particular, on the view
under discussion, these principles should not be read as providing absolute rules for
when intentions should be reconsidered. Rather, they should be taken to provide
grounds for reconsideration or non-reconsideration (cf. Holton 2009, pp. 160–162).
When such principles clash, then, we don’t have a contradiction but rather a case
where we need to determine which rule of thumb wins out (that is, which provides
stronger grounds).
So the question at hand is how we are to weigh STAKES against FORESIGHT. Well,
let’s consider a well-known case where they clash (adapted from Gauthier 1997):
GIRL GERMS: A young boy, Charlie, has no interest in girls. However, he
notices that many boys become obsessed with them as they grow up. Charlie
carries out his research and comes to understand why this occurs. He then
forms an intention to not date girls as he grows.
Table 2 The blade runner’s button
Android Human
Press - 1 - 1
Refrain 0 0
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Now, we can imagine that a few years have passed and Charlie finds himself
attracted to girls. Should he reconsider his intention to refrain from dating girls? It
is, I take it, clear that he should.
What do the principles discussed above suggest. Well, FORESIGHT argues against
reconsideration: Charlie knew that his views would change in just this way when he
formed his intention. As such, the intention formation already accounted for this
change.
On the other hand, STAKES argues for reconsideration. After all, when Charlie
formed the intention, he did so in order to avoid something that he saw as icky. But
as Charlie is straight, at the later time, he believes that maintaining the intention
would lead him to forgo one of the fundamental experiences of human life
(romantic entanglement). The later stakes substantially outweigh the earlier costs
and so clause (1) of STAKES supports reconsideration.
Insofar as reconsideration is the appropriate response to this case, we have
grounds to think that when STAKES and FORESIGHT clash, it is STAKES that wins out.11
Consequently, reflection on FORESIGHT does not undermine my discussion of the
Blade Runner’s Button. The second objection has been addressed.
5.3 Objection 3: CDT and reconsideration
Throughout this paper, I have assumed that CDT cannot be used to determine
whether to reconsider an intention. Instead, we must appeal to heuristics like STAKES
in this context. Yet, CDT is a general theory of choice: it tells us how we ought to
make any decision at all.12 As such, it applies just as much to the decision of
whether to reconsider an intention as to any other decision. So, it might be objected,
the view in this paper is flawed.13 Further, it might be worried that once CDT is
applied to determine when an agent ought to reconsider, the provided solution to the
Blade Runner’s Button will collapse. If so then CDT will once again be challenged
by this case.
So far, so glum. However, this objection ultimately fails. In particular, it fails
because it mischaracterises the nature of intention reconsideration.14 On Bratman’s
view, agents do not typically decide whether to reconsider an intention. Rather
agents simply do, or do not, reconsider as a result of habits or tendencies towards
doing so. So discussions of reconsideration are not discussions of decisions but of
habit. As the evaluation of habitual behaviour is beyond CDT’s domain, CDT does
11 Of course, it could be argued that this isn’t always the case: that sometimes FORESIGHT overrides
STAKES. Again, however, I remain unconcerned by abstract objections. Absent an argument that FORESIGHT
sometimes overrides STAKES, and indeed does so in the case at hand, I take the current objection to be
unconcerning.
12 The word ‘‘decision’’ is ambiguous between: (a) a particular option (the decision to go to the ball); or
(b) a deliberative situation (the decision of whether to go to the ball). Here, I utilise the latter sense. So:
CDT can guide us in any deliberative situation.
13 I thank a referee for raising this issue.
14 At least, it does so given Bratman’s account of intentions. And, remember, I am assuming the truth of
this account, and exploring what follows.
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not apply to question of reconsideration. Instead, as I have assume throughout this
paper, it is silent in this context.15 So reflection on this matter does not undermine
the offered solution to the Blade Runner’s Button. The third, and final, of our
objections fails.
6 Conclusions
The Blade Runner’s Button doesn’t undermine CDT if options involve intention
formation, and we accept Bratman’s view of intentions. Insofar as such a view of
optionhood and of intentions is plausible, this means that the proponent of CDT can
happily accept this view and avoid the force of Egan’s objection. So much the better
for CDT.
So much the better, too, for discussions of optionhood. After all, one might
dispute the importance of such discussions. Does it really matter, one might ask,
whether decision theory endorses the decision to exercise or the act of exercising?
Either way, it endorses the exercising option and this might seem to be all that
matters. On this basis, it might be thought that the question of optionhood is a fringe
question, of no interest to broader decision-theoretic discussions.
However, the above argument reveals that this is too fast: the nature of
optionhood has broader implications. After all, if options are actions, then Egan’s
objection to CDT succeeds in its initial form. On the other hand, if options involve
the formation of intentions then, as demonstrated above, Egan’s objection fails. So
Egan’s objections cannot be evaluated without an account of optionhood.
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Hedden, B. (2012). Options and the subjective ought. Philosophical Studies, 158, 343–360.
15 One could adopt a broader view of CDT, where this theory does evaluate habitual reconsideration
behaviour. My defence will not apply to such a theory. Still, I find this broad theory implausible (for
reasons gestured at in Bratman 1987, p. 73; Holton 2009, pp. 3, 70–166). So, I rest content with
defending the narrow form of CDT.
Intentions and instability a defence of causal decision theory 803
123
Holton, R. (2009). Willing, wanting, waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joyce, J. M. (1999). The foundations of causal decision theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, J. M. (2012). Regret and instability in causal decision theory. Synthese, 187, 123–145.
Raz, J. (1975). Reasons for action, decisions and norms. Mind, 84, 481–499.
804 A. Bales
123
